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The Gordian knot: Regulatory relationship 
and legal education.   
 
 
Paul Maharg 
 
Symbolic control, through its pedagogic modalities, attempts to shape and distribute forms of 
consciousness, identity and desire.1  
Regulators must facilitate and encourage, not just accredit and monitor.2 
 
 
Abstract 
This article is a version of themes presented at a plenary lecture given at the 2016 Legal Education Conference at the 
Chinese University of Hong Kong.  Regulation of legal education is becoming increasingly important as regulation becomes 
more complex and intrusive in educational design and practice.  As a consequence of pressures upon regulators from 
government, consumer groups, educational institutions, the profession and other stakeholders there has been an increase 
in the number and size of reports and reviews as regulators and accreditors seek to position and re-position their practices 
within the regulatory field.  In that field regulatory relationship is one aspect of the regulation of legal education that is 
insufficiently researched and understood.  This article seeks to explore models by which the relationship between 
regulators and legal educators can be improved.  It begins by summarising some of the regulatory literature on legal 
education, and suggesting that a complexity theory approach in safety regulation could be used in legal education.  An 
example of regulatory relationship between educational institution and regulator will be described and aspects analysed; 
and in the final section I outline possible ways forward for regulators and legal educators. 
 
 
Introduction 
Legal education regulation 
Regulation is a complex, socially-pervasive field of activity in industrialised economies.  It takes many 
forms, and while regulation theory and practice is not uniform, there is a certain convergence 
around regulatory domains that regulators, particularly those of professional activities, are engaged 
in.  These domains often include the control of risk, the creation and management of compliance 
regimes, the protection of consumer interests, and the monitoring of performance and outcomes 
cultures.3  At a meta-level it includes the management of the processes of regulation and 
deregulation itself by which a regulator’s activities are authorised and implemented.4  Recently a 
group of regulatory strategies have come to be adopted as alternatives to more adversarial 
command-and-control regimes.5  These include risk-based regulation, meta-regulation, principles-
                                                          
1 Basil Bernstein & Joseph Solomon, “Pedagogy, Identity and the Construction of a Theory of Symbolic Control”: Basil 
Bernstein questioned by Joseph Solomon, 20 BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 265–279 (1999), 269. 
2 JULIAN WEBB ET AL., SETTING STANDARDS.  THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVICES EDUCATION AND TRAINING REGULATION IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
(SRA, BSB, IPS) (2013) 
3 Insert here definition of risk-based regulation from LETR p.87 no.16. 
4 In the Legal Education and Training Report we dealt with many such issues, and my views, on both regulated and 
unregulated sectors of the profession, have not changed since we wrote the report.4  Id. at 264.   
5 See Regulation: After command and control,  in THE HUMAN FACE OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DONALD HARRIS (K. Hawkins ed. 
1997) 45–73. 
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based regulation, outcomes-focused regulation and strategies of enrolment, among others.6  Such 
forms of regulation are in competition with each other; and, as Casey and Scott pointed out quoting 
Black, are responses to an underlying legitimacy dilemma: it ‘is simply not possible to have complete 
legitimacy from all aspects of [the regulated] environment’.7 
 
In this tangled, contested field, and in place of a conservative view of regulation-as-oversight merely, 
I argue first that regulatory theory and practices applied to legal education should go beyond the 
basics of control of risk, management of compliance and protection of consumer interest to the 
development of regulatory relationship between stakeholders that will improve educational theory 
and practice.  Second, I argue that, four years on from LETR and the articulation in that report of a 
‘shared space’ approach to legal education regulation, we need that approach more urgently than 
before.  In developing it we need to take account of multi- and inter-disciplinary approaches, and 
inter-jurisdictional approaches that consist of not just global best practices but the complex weave 
of global with local circumstance, local regulatory codes and local practices.  Taking account of the 
cognitive, organisational and social contexts of regulation in this way helps us to understand what 
may succeed locally, and why.  I give an extended example of this in development and practice from 
professional legal practice and regulation in Scotland.  Finally, I shall argue that transformation of 
regulatory relationship cannot take place unless we have an informational and data structure that is 
commensurate with our ambitions for regulation in legal education. Throughout, there is an implicit 
argument for interdisciplinarity.  I argue elsewhere in depth that interdisciplinarity is both 
conceptual and practical in nature.8  Too often we treat education and law in separate silos, without 
recognising the effect that one has on the other, and how our distinctive modes and discourses are 
formed from jurisdictional cultures – which include regulation.  We also do not sufficiently recognise 
the advantages of interdisciplinarity in opening up the fractures in disciplines so as to enable 
expansive exchanges – what Foucault called, with regard to forms of rationality, the ‘transmissions, 
transferences, interferences’ between them.9 
 
Beyond standard-setting 
It goes without saying that regulation of legal education involves standard-setting in all aspects of 
the domain.  But this is not the only activity that regulation could involve, and of itself it tends to be 
one of the negative virtues of regulation – the default position being that legitimate interests must 
be defended by maintaining or raising standards. Along with this, however, goes the view that 
regulation is a ‘necessary evil’, a notion that research indicated was ‘widespread in the legal services 
sector’.10  The sparse, standards-setting view of regulation and the corollary distaste for it (spilling 
over at times into hostility) among regulatees under regimes such as Outcomes-Focused Regulation 
(OFR), comes about as binary relational response that reinforces each polar position.11  It also 
                                                          
6 For an account of these and other approaches, and their performance within the financial services industry in the recent 
global financial crisis, see Julia Black, Paradoxes and failures: “New governance” techniques and the financial crisis, 75 
MODERN LAW REVIEW 1037–63 (2012). 
7 Donal Casey & Colin Scott, The crystallization of regulatory norms., 38 JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIETY 76–95 (2011), 92, citing 
Julia Black, Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability in polycentric regulatory regimes, 2 REGULATION & 
GOVERNANCE 137–164 (2008), 153. 
8 See for example Paul Maharg, Sea-change, 18 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 139–64 (2012); PAUL MAHARG, 
TRANSFORMING LEGAL EDUCATION: LEARNING AND TEACHING THE LAW IN THE EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Ashgate Publishing) (2007) 
9 MICHEL FOUCAULT, POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, CULTURE: INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS, 1977-1984 (L. Kritzman ed., A. Sheridan trans., 
Routledge) (1988), 36.  It is useful to compare Foucault’s concept of the fissures in forms of rationalities that enable 
transferences with Roberto Unger’s concept of ‘expanded discourse’, developed in defence of a version of radical 
interdisciplinarity – Roberto Unger, The Critical Legal Studies movement, 96 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 561–675 (1983), 561. 
10 Webb et al, supra, note 2 at 264.  
11 Webb et al, supra, note 17 at 87 describe OFR in the professional legal domain in England and Wales as follows: ‘OFR 
Outcomes are […] derived […] from general principles of good regulation and the eight “regulatory objectives” specified by 
s.1, LSA [Legal Services Act] 2007 […].  These apply to all aspects of the regulatory work of the Legal Services Board and 
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depends on a view of good regulation as being either sufficient regulatory control, or minimalist 
control, that is to say, an absence of what both regulator and regulatee would both regard as a 
universal evil, namely over-regulation and over-monitoring.   
 
Underpinning both sides in this binary is the assumption that regulation exists as a set of conditions 
and rules for those being regulated, and that the regulation framework needs to be fit for purpose.  
Defining purpose, however, is no easy matter given the often wide variety of legitimate interests 
that contest for priority; and this is true of every regulated domain.  Even apparently obvious 
positions, such as zero-harm or the absence of accidents in the safety industries, are problematic 
when one begins to engage with theories of how accidents occur (eg risk compensation theory) and 
the psychology and context of actors and their networks of relationships.  As John Adams points out 
in his analysis of the effects of anti-lock braking systems (ABS) on accident statistics,  
When introduced, their superiority persuaded many insurance companies to offer discounts 
for cars with anti-lock brakes. Most of these discounts have now been withdrawn. The ABS 
cars were not having fewer accidents, they were having different accidents. Or perhaps they 
were having fewer accidents, but no fewer fatal accidents; the evidence from various studies 
is less than conclusive.12 
The binary view may also take for granted that deterrence positions adopted by regulators works to 
deter types of behaviour, when in fact the conditions under which deterrence may actually succeed 
are complex, and the apparent obviousness of the assumption may blind even researchers to the 
subtle effects that deterrent regulation has upon actors.13   
 
There is another view of regulation, however, that defines the field in which regulation operates as 
one of inescapable complexity, where every intervention by a regulator, or move by a regulated 
party makes the field more complex for the main actors and the legitimate interests of other 
players; and that this complexity goes unregarded by the parties involved, for often quite complex 
motives.  Amongst a number of commentators on this, Sidney Dekker has produced what is perhaps 
the most interesting application of complexity theory to the situation.14   
 
Before I outline some of the key traits of Dekker’s approach it might be helpful to define what, in 
legal educational terms, Dekker would regard as a complex system.  Dekker himself makes a helpful 
distinction between a complicated system and a complex system.  A jet airliner is a complicated 
system, but nevertheless one that can be disassembled and re-assembled from its component parts, 
because it is ‘understandable and describable in principle’.  By contrast, complex systems work in 
real time; each component works with another but in local relation only, and the component or 
manufacturer of the component would be unaware of the behaviour of other components in real-
time action, in multiple complex environmental contexts: 
Jet airliners become complex systems when they are deployed in a nominally regulated 
world with cultural diversity, receiver-oriented versus transmitter-oriented communication 
expectations, different hierarchical gradients in a cockpit and multiple levels of politeness 
differentiation […], effects of fatigue, procedural drift […], varied training and language 
standards […], as well as cross-cultural differences in risk perceptions, attitudes and 
behaviour […]. This is where complicated systems become complex because they are 
                                                          
each of the frontline regulators.  They are a significant innovation of the LSA 2007 and a key recommendation of the 
Clementi Review (2004)’.  
12 Id., Literature Review, chapter 3 at 16, quoting MANAGING TRANSPORT RISKS: WHAT WORKS? PAPER FOR RISK THEORY HANDBOOK. 
(2010), available at http://www.john-adams.co.uk/papers-reports/ at 15 (last visited Jan 30, 2017).  
13 A classic study in this regard is that of H. Laurence Ross on the effectiveness of drink-driving legislation in Sweden and 
Norway.  H. Laurence Ross, The Scandinavian Myth: The Effectiveness of Drinking-and-Driving Legislation in Sweden and 
Norway, 4 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 285–310 (1975). 
14 Sidney Dekker et al., The complexity of failure: Implications of complexity theory for safety investigations, 49 SAFETY 
SCIENCE 939–945 (2011), 942. 
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opened up to influences that lie way beyond engineering specifications and reliability 
predictions.15 
 
Dekker’s example can be applied to the system of an educational programme, such as the 
professional legal education degree in Hong Kong, the PCLL.  Described in depth on paper, as if one 
were seeking approval from a regulator, for instance, and the curricular, 2-D object of a PCLL 
curriculum is complicated, and will include purpose and learning outcomes, progression, certification 
level, curriculum structure, support for student work, recognition of prior learning, teaching 
methodologies, assessment design, summative assessment map, evaluation of programme and 
much else.  But this complicated system becomes a complex system when it is run in real-time.  Each 
component will then have interdependencies and interactions in complex contexts, where complex 
relations grow in time.  For example what might appear to be a relatively simple example of 
feedback on task needs to dovetail with feedforward, and with summative assessment content and 
design.  Through time and over a number of cycles, the system becomes more complex as 
components alter on the basis of student evaluation, compliance with changed regulation, staff 
turnover and other changes.   
 
Inevitably, it becomes too complex a system for even the most detailed curriculum log to describe 
the micro-behaviour of each component in the system.  Macro-events, then, such as regulatory 
oversight, monitoring visits or programme reviews, tend to simplify the complex interactions of 
micro-components, or deal with them in terms of narrative stereotypes, or tick-box comparators.  
Thus even programme staff who have most design knowledge will have only a partial view of the 
whole complex system, though they may make inflated knowledge claims in formal documentation; 
and this partial view leads to ‘curriculum drift’ (comparable to what Dekker calls ‘procedural drift’, 
but in disciplinary content as well as educational structure) where purpose and aims lose focus as 
component changes multiply and their effects become less controllable.  
 
Educators can also be blind-sided by asymmetry of expertise.  What appears to experts to be a 
reasonable way to understand complex law or process may be baffling to novices because experts 
assume knowledge or habitual practice, or move too fast, or miss key stages that to an experienced 
practitioner would be entirely taken for granted, but isn’t so for novices.  Paradoxically, what is true 
of students is also true of regulators, who nearly always have a lot less knowledge of the complex 
educational system under review, both content and structure, and rely on highly constrained 
instruments to obtain even that.  And yet regulators, faced with monitoring multiple programmes 
and with a concern that required levels of competence for licensure are comparable across 
institutions and programmes, often are under pressure to set and enforce clear standards.   
Partly as a result of such multiple complexity and pressure, legal education regulators are 
increasingly retrenching from frontline regulation, and relying upon centralised assessments to 
ensure comparability, robustness, standardisation and reliability in assessment for licensure.16   
                                                          
15 Id. 
16 See for example the recent consultations upon a Solicitors Qualifying Examination, proposed by the SRA (see 
https://www.sra.org.uk/home/hot-topics/Solicitors-Qualifying-Examination.page , (last visited Jan 30, 2017)), and 
proposals by the Law Society of Hong Kong for a Common Entrance Examination (http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-
kong/law-crime/article/1898439/law-society-pushes-ahead-unified-solicitors-exam-2021, (last visited Jan 30, 2017)).  This 
is true also in medical education, where the same direction by regulators has been under debate for some time now.  See 
Julian Archer et al., The medical licensing examination debate, REGULATION & GOVERNANCE n/a-n/a (2016).  The debate has 
been stimulated in part by the studies that show the complexity and difficulty involved in achieving comparable standards 
across institutions.  See Joachim P. Sturmberg & John Hinchy, Borderline competence – from a complexity perspective: 
conceptualization and implementation for certifying examinations, 16 JOURNAL OF EVALUATION IN CLINICAL PRACTICE 867–872 
(2010).  See also the series of studies carried out on comparative competence by Kathy Boursicot and colleagues – 
Katharine Boursicot, Setting Standards in a Professional Higher Education Course: Defining the Concept of the Minimally 
Competent Student in Performance-Based Assessment at the Level of Graduation from Medical School, 60 HIGHER EDUCATION 
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In these debates it is understandable that regulators seek to simplify the complexity of the objects of 
regulatory regimes, not just for themselves but for all concerned.  And yet seeking simplicity will 
almost certainly lead to further problems.  Dekker shows how complexity theory can assist us to 
understand complex systems and regulation: 
1. In complex systems there is no clear ‘relationship between component behaviour and 
system-level outcomes’. 
2. In complexity theory claims that the isolation of a single narrative as a truth-narrative is 
impossible. 
3. Research into both failure and success requires to piece together multiple perspectives in a 
complex system. 
4. Multiple narratives in complex systems will be repetitious, rarely coherent, sometimes 
contradictory. 
5. Narrative pluralism and diversity is not a fault: it gives us ‘more opportunities for learning’.17 
When seeking clarity by reducing complexity, then, regulatory monitoring may focus on individual 
components (eg objects such as technologies, or human errors or achievements) without seeing the 
complex social, cognitive, epistemological and organisational whole that gives rise to the situation.  
Sometimes, too, the regulatory focus on control, compliance and quantification of risk can narrow 
parties’ range of vision about systems, and induce indulgence on the part of regulators, or loss of 
innovation edge and complaisance or superficial self-analysis on the part of the regulated.18 
 
One alternative to regulation as standards-setting, and an alternative that may accommodate 
complexity theory, is a view of regulation that is more community-based than many regulatory 
discourses may permit.  In the Legal Education and Training Report on professional legal education 
in England and Wales we characterised this approach as a ‘shared space’ approach to regulation, an 
approach I have since described in detail elsewhere, and applied to the specific topic of innovation 
and technology in legal education.19    Below I shall describe and analyse an instance where it began 
to form out of the necessities and opportunities that underpinned the formation a new professional 
curriculum in Scotland; and the relationship of gradual regulatory reform that grew around it.   
 
 
Regulation and relationship: professional legal education in Scotland 
GGSL and the politics of curriculum development 
In 1999 I joined the newly-formed Glasgow Graduate School of Law (GGSL), which brought together 
most of the graduate programmes and all the professional programmes of the University of Glasgow 
Law School and the Strathclyde University Law School.  A key task was to harmonise the two primary 
professional programmes, the Diplomas in Legal Practice, and to do so in line with a new plan for the 
Diploma set out by the Law Society of Scotland (LSS).20  Since the programmes had the same 
subjects, were taught by the same method of employing practitioner-tutors, and assessment by 
                                                          
QUARTERLY 74–90 (2006); and  Katharine A M Boursicot et al., Using borderline methods to compare passing standards for 
OSCEs at graduation across three medical schools, 41 MEDICAL EDUCATION 1024–1031 (2007). 
17 It is interesting to note how complexity theory and Dekker et al’s use of it draws from narrative theory and narratology – 
an example of the interdisciplinarity I discussed above. 
18 See Sidney Dekker & Corrie Pitzer, Examining the asymptote in safety progress: a literature review, 22 INTERNATIONAL 
JOURNAL OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND ERGONOMICS 57–65 (2016) 
19 See Webb et al, supra note 2 at 268; Paul Maharg, Shared space: regulation, technology and legal education in a global 
context, 6 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY  (2015), http://ejlt.org/article/view/425 (last accessed: 30 Jan 2017). 
20 This new approach emphasised professional skills, since an earlier brief review of the DLP had indicated that students 
were lacking in skills required by legal service providers.   The new approach was outlined in a brief document: knowledge 
components were still expressed as aims and objectives, and skills were outlined in several pages.  Little other information 
was given out. 
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unseen written examination was largely the key mode of evaluation, I assumed that the task would 
be relatively simple.  Within a matter of months it became clear that this was a naïve assumption.  
There were strong and quite different local cultures at each university that reflected the different 
identities of the two law schools and their links with the profession; and these identities played out 
in the forms of teaching and learning that each programme had developed and wished to retain.  
The politics of the merger were complex; we fused what we could, but the strategy of attempting to 
bring the best of the two programmes together could not work optimally because each institution 
had a different notion of what ‘best’ actually looked like.  Moreover the programmes were difficult 
to reconcile with each other because their curriculum drift could not be reconciled with a detailed 
regulated plan – control of the national curriculum by the LSS was relatively light-touch.   
 
The only answer to a rapidly deteriorating situation was to develop a third way: to seize the initiative 
of the new institution, develop a concept of a new progamme with a new approach to learning, 
teaching and assessment.  It quickly became clear that this also required a fresh approach to both 
the profession and to our regulator, the LSS.  What the new GGSL programme looked like has been 
described elsewhere.21  Suffice to say for our purposes here that the DLP was constructivist in 
design, implemented active-learning innovations in curriculum design and the use of technology-
enhanced learning.  It began to draw upon professional practice programmes in other disciplines, 
and deploy them with digital resources. 
 
All that meant liaising with many stakeholders including the profession; but above all, we also 
needed to see the new programme as it developed from a student point of view.  I therefore asked 
two students to keep detailed journals of their experiences on the 28-week long programme.  One 
stopped soon after, but the second completed an entire year of journaling.  I interviewed the 
student several times during the process, and read sections of the journal while it was in progress.  
To reflect on the final journal was a sobering experience.  At times what he described scarcely 
seemed to be the same programme, certainly as we had designed and implemented it.  For example, 
when I thought I had designed cycles of activities in a Foundation Course that operated on skills 
cycles of tell-show-do-review, and left time for reflection, it was clear that this student (and others, 
to judge from his journal) had been flung into an alien form of learning with arrays of activities that 
often absorbed them, but left them bemused because there was little time to absorb their learning.  
And the ‘show’ component of the cycle clearly didn’t work and was simply another form of ‘tell’.  In 
general the feedback from students on Foundation Course was very positive; but the granular 
experience of this student and others was another and quite complex narrative; and was telling a 
different story.  As a result I redrafted and streamlined the design of the Foundation Course, and 
began a nine-month multimedia project on professional legal skills to script, shoot, organise 
production and post-production, and embed online workshops in the Course.   The multimedia units 
were highly successful and are still in use at Strathclyde University Law School, 16 years later.  They 
would not have come about, certainly in the form that they did, without detailed journal comment 
from the student. 
 
Curricular innovation and the Law Society of Scotland 
These experiences and many others convinced me that the design complexity of professional legal 
education at GGSL, which was fast proceeding with projects in digital education and in skills 
education that borrowed from other jurisdictions and disciplines, needed to be presented, 
discussed, analysed.  Above all I needed to know what our regulator, the LSS, made of all this.  As I 
said, their regulatory control was light-touch by comparison with other jurisdictions, for example 
control over the Legal Practice Course in England by the then regulator, the Law Society of England & 
                                                          
21 See for example Karen Barton et al., Authentic fictions: simulation, professionalism and legal learning, 14 CLINICAL LAW 
REVIEW 143 (2007);  MAHARG (2007) supra note 8; Maharg (2012) supra note 8.   
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Wales.  While this was problematic when carrying out comparative work between two programmes, 
it had the significant advantage that it stimulated and cleared space for innovation and 
experimentation.  Indeed we could not have achieved nearly as much as we did in the GGSL had we 
the same onerous regulatory regime as operated in the LPC in England – an observation that was 
made by LPC staff I met at conferences and workshops.   
 
In 2002 I joined the main Education and Training Committee of the LSS, also serving on a number of 
sub-committees and working parties and as a consultant, and remained on committee till I left the 
jurisdiction in 2010.  What became apparent early on was that while Education & Training 
Committee was the main development forum, little happened to improve education at a granular 
level within DLPs.  Instead the Committee’s time was taken up with the development of new 
elements – a Professional Competence Course, and an Assessment of Professional Competence 
project, for instance.  These were useful projects but it seemed to me that the DLP needed major 
reform, but that such reform could only take place with reform of the entire process of legal 
education in Scotland, from LLB right through DLP, two-year traineeship and continuing professional 
development.  In addition it was clear that much of what DLP staff at every university learned about 
their teaching and design practices went unjournaled, unshared, and therefore forgotten.  To 
parallel the idea of curriculum drift, and Dekker’s ‘procedural drift’, it seemed that there was design 
drift, with each DLP centre still enacting versions of what it had, historically, construed professional 
education to be.  Moreover there seemed to be little inter-jurisdictional awareness or 
interdisciplinary curiosity. 
 
In 2005 the Law Society decided to carry out a fundamental review of professional education in 
Scotland.  Their review during 2006-7 considered competing views of legal education (and for the 
first time used an inter-jurisdictional literature review), focused on setting standards, took account 
of the range of titles to practice as well as activities within practices and entities that practised in 
Scotland.  It also took account of undergraduate LLB programmes in universities, as well as the 
continuing professional development of solicitors in practice.  It focused also on issues of gender, 
equality and diversity.  The jurisdiction-wide online and face-to-face consultation that took place 
was one of the most remarkable activities that Education & Training Committee ever undertook, a 
courageous step for a small jurisdiction’s regulator with limited resources at its disposal.   
 
For my part, I contributed to a literature review on digital education and practices in other 
jurisdictions.  On the basis of the feedback across the jurisdiction, I was also tasked to assist in 
writing a new set of outcomes and standards for replacements of the Diploma and Professional 
Competence Course, namely Professional Education And Training, 1 and 2.  I wrote outcomes for the 
skills components of the PEAT 1 outcomes and assisted in the design of PEAT 2.22  First the skills had 
to be defined, reading from my interpretation of the consultation data.  In the process I drew upon 
years of design experience at the GGSL and before, as well as curriculum renewal papers I wrote for 
Education & Training.  At the forefront, though, were the data arising from qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of the consultation on values, principles, processes and content of professional 
legal education.  Communication and partnership were seen as key to the future success of legal 
education in Scotland. 
 
Within the remit of our working party we mapped out three key aspects to the new professional 
programme designs: transactional learning, professionalism and an open source economy that 
would function as – to adopt the title of Yochai Benkler’s analysis of the networked information 
                                                          
22 Original documents on file with the author and the Law Society of Scotland. 
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economy to the microcosm of legal education – a wealth of networks that would join up 
jurisdictions, regulators and single education providers.23  These are described in more detail below. 
 
Transactional learning 
This was an approach to learning that we developed in the GGSL to explain to explain to ourselves, 
our students and others what we were attempting to do in legal education.  There were three 
aspects that were important, and which were mapped out from my reading of jurisprudential, 
educational and interdisciplinary educational writings.  First, transactional learning focused upon 
legal transactions in the broadest sense – any form of process or representation by a lawyer on 
behalf of a client, in any area of law.24 Second, it denoted an educational approach to legal learning, 
and with seven traits: 
 
active learning 
 through performance in authentic transactions 
   involving reflection in and on learning 
     deep collaborative learning, and 
       holistic or process learning, 
         with relevant professional assessment 
           that includes ethical standards. 
 
Third, it was shorthand for an approach to education and epistemology that was hermeneutic and 
phenomenological in its approach, where education was less a form of interaction with the world 
and more a transaction within the world.  In this sense the approach was based upon Dewey’s 
educational praxis, where educational and philosophical (or here, jurisprudential) inquiry was 
fundamentally the same activity.  It is tempting to see these three layers of meaning as becoming 
more profound and complex as one moves from one through to three.  But – and following 
complexity theory as well as Dewey’s Pragmatist approach – a separation of the apparent 
dichotomies of superficial/practical from profound/theoretical makes no sense: theory is imbricated 
with practice; practice imbues theory.  Transactional learning was thus not merely a handy heuristic 
for tutors or for PEAT 1 designers or to be used only in professional education – it was an approach 
to legal learning that was rooted in educational and jurisprudential discourse. 25   
 
Professionalism 
There was, though, a need for a binding concept, once that could construct regulatory legitimacy for 
the LSS, and at the same time for DLP providers, including the GGSL, express the accountability and 
responsiveness of students, educational providers and the profession.  When I considered the 
results of the LSS consultation, as well as my own experience at the GGSL, and on Education & 
Training Committee, it was clear that throughout the jurisdiction there was no overall guiding 
                                                          
23 See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (Yale University Press) 
(2006).  Benkler’s title, of course, is another example of a book title answering an earlier book – in this case Adam Smith’s 
The Wealth of Nations.   
24 In that sense the approach is profoundly Realist, in origin at least, and aligned with the New Legal Realism movement, 
which seeks to enact a Deweyan Pragmatist approach to understanding law’s power in society.  See Howard Erlanger et al., 
Is It Time for a New Legal Realism, 2005 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 335 (2005); Stewart Macaulay, The New versus the Old Legal 
Realism: Things Ain’t What They Used to Be, 2005 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 365 (2005); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The 
New Legal Realism, 75 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 831–851 (2008).  A good example of its work is Elizabeth Mertz’s 
study of discourse and power in US law schools that reveals how the critical shift from moral frameworks to apparently 
value-neutral legal frameworks occurs in law school classrooms.  Her book is a classic study in sociolinguistics and legal 
anthropology, and a good example of how New Legal Realism, in its emphasis on researching how law and legal cultures 
affect the lives of all who come into contact with it, differs from the older, early twentieth-century forms of legal realism, 
which tended to focus more on the actors and processes of formal legal systems.  ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW 
SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” (OUP USA) (2007). 
25 See MAHARG (2007) supra note 8, especially chapters 7, 8 and 9. 
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concept for educational process.  It was also clear that from an educational as well as a regulatory 
point of view, there had been no articulated approach to the links between educational theory and 
practice in Scottish professional legal education.  Indeed the same could be said for legal education 
generally in Scotland.  Law schools had made few sustained attempts to say to themselves, to 
students, regulators, funders, the profession, the general public, what they did in legal education 
and why.  There were of course internal university documents, often produced for Quality Assurance 
purposes, which under the Scots system of learning enhancement had the distinct advantage of 
focusing on the institution’s goals and means of attaining them.  However these tended to be 
institutional documents, not rooted in the educational discourse of specific disciplinary forms of 
education or linked directly to regulatory practices of professional bodies.  
 
My interest in professionalism as a binding concept for regulatory as well as an educational purpose 
had arisen from research questions generated by the literature – in a general sense, how was it that 
novices in a profession learned to be professionals?  And how did this happen in what much of the 
research described as dislocated professional communities so characteristic of late capitalism?  If we 
accept that, as practice theorists have it, practices are the ‘source and carrier of meaning, language 
and normativity’, and our understanding of practices cannot be separated from an understanding of 
the social context of the practices, then how does this affect our construction of educational 
processes for professional practice?  Finally, how does professionalism contribute to the general 
concept of moral and ethical formation in our students; and could it be said that, as a core concept, 
it is too narrow and loaded to bear the weight of that formation?   
 
Through our work at the GGSL, and in reading the literature in other disciplines, particularly medical 
education, it did seem that professionalism could provide an over-arching framework for our 
purposes in Scotland.26 The work of Maxine Papadakis and her colleagues in medical education on 
evaluation of medical professionalism was particularly in point.  With her permission we used her 
documentation at the GGSL to assist us evaluate the professionalism of novice lawyers.27   
 
I therefore drew up a visual model for the mandatory core of the new PEAT 1 programme (Fig 1), 
where the previously lengthy curriculum core (which we agreed on LSS was problematic) was 
slimmed down, giving space for providers and students to construct and to participate in elective 
learning, integration with PEAT 2, and with the use of e-portfolios to help bridge the two 
programmes.  The core of the two learning programmes was based upon professionalism, which 
later in the documentation was described as a spiral curriculum throughout the three-year period of 
professional legal education.28   
 
                                                          
26 See for example the work of Karen Barton and Fiona Westwood on the relationships between learning and trust in 
groupwork within virtual firms, and which in part gave rise to their further work on the resonance of vocational learning.  
See Karen Barton & Fiona Westwood, From student to trainee practitioner - a study of team working as a learning 
experience, 6 WEB JOURNAL OF CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES  (2006), 
http://www.bailii.org/uk/other/journals/WebJCLI/2006/issue3/barton-westwood3.html; Developing professional character 
- trust, values and learning,  in AFFECT AND LEGAL EDUCATION: EMOTION IN LEARNING AND TEACHING THE LAW 235–56; THE CALLING OF 
LAW: THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF VOCATIONAL LEGAL EDUCATION (F. Westwood & K. Barton ed., Routledge) (2016).  In medical education 
the debates around professionalism have been vigorous and contested, and have provided legal educators with models 
and arguments that can be applied to legal education.  
27 Maxine A. Papadakis et al., Unprofessional behavior in medical school is associated with subsequent disciplinary action by 
a state medical board, 79 ACADEMIC MEDICINE: JOURNAL OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES 244–249 (2004).  See 
also Peggy Wagner et al., Defining medical professionalism: a qualitative study, 41 MEDICAL EDUCATION 288–294 (2007).   
28 Documents on file with the author and the LSS.  It should be noted that these diagrams and tables are of historical value: 
they are early drafts of what later became the formal PEAT programmes, and are now no longer current practice on the 
LSS professional programmes, though of course they have contributed to the development of current practice.  In an 
earlier draft of the tables I included negative as well as positive indicators. 
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Figure 1: Mandatory core of the PEAT 1 programme 
 
Upon this model the new framework for the period of the two-year traineeship and its education 
was based, namely PEAT 2 (Fig 2): 
 
 
Figure 2: PEAT 2 basic framework 
 
 
Professionalism, a major domain for the programme, was defined less as outcomes and more as a 
commitment to a range of values, tasks, skills and traits outlined in Fig 3: 
 
 
Major 
domain 
1.  Professionalism   
Minor 
domain 
Throughout the 
programme a 
student should 
demonstrate a 
commitment to: 
Positive indicators Appropriate forms of 
assessment 
1. The interests of 
justice and 
democracy in 
society 
Displays an interest in the workings of justice in 
society; has an ethical awareness of legal practice, 
and a developing sense of the regulatory framework 
of professional ethics.  Shows awareness of his or 
her responsibility to improve the capacity of legal 
institutions and process. 
Best assessed longitudinally 
throughout the programme, by 
more than one assessor, and in 
more than one assessment, so 
that a variety of views are 
obtained under different 
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2. Effective and 
competent legal 
services on behalf of 
a client 
Updates and expands knowledge of the law, 
knowledge of legal practice, client-centred practice 
and management of client service.  Pays careful 
attention to standard of detail in legal work; evaluates 
own client care; appraises new forms of client care 
and adopts improvements; acts quickly to protect 
clients and the public from risk. 
conditions.  Providers should be 
under an obligation to inform 
the Society of students who 
obtain problematic scores in 
any of the minor domains.   
 
Forms of assessment could 
include: 
1. Client-based long case 
2. Case file review of 
simulated client file 
3. Portfolio – self-assessment 
4. Log book/activity 
log/confidential file 
5. Critical incident review 
6. Peer-review 
7. Transactional assessment 
8. Tutor reports 
3. Continuing 
professional 
education and 
personal 
development 
Is aware of own strengths and weaknesses and 
forms plans to develop character, values, knowledge 
and skills throughout the course. 
4. Diversity and public 
service 
Shows an awareness of the importance of equality of 
access to and participation in legal services 
regardless of culture, race, religion, gender, 
disability; assists in the training of new lawyers 
through peer learning and training of undergraduate 
students or other groups in society. 
5. Personal integrity 
and civility towards 
colleagues, clients 
and the courts 
Is honest with all others on the course; relates to 
colleagues on the programme with civility; treats 
tutors, administrative staff and others with respect. 
 
Figure 3: Professionalism values and traits. 
 
Finally, skills were envisaged less as free-standing behavioural components, which they are in other 
legal educational regulatory codes, and were dovetailed into the professionalism framework and 
were interleaved with each other as communicational skills.  They consisted of the following: 
1. Professional relationships 
2. Interviewing 
3. Negotiation 
4. Writing and drafting 
5. Transactional research 
6. Use of technology 
7. Advocacy 
The skills were designed to interlock with the basic concepts of transactional learning and 
professionalism.  Thus professional research was defined as transactional research, and the two out 
of seven total outcomes for the minor domain (Fig 4) illustrates how they were defined: 
 
Major 
domain 
2.  Professional 
Communication 
  
Minor 
domain 
2 (v)  Transactional 
research 
By the end of the 
programme students 
should be able to: 
Positive indicators Appropriate forms of assessment 
1. Gather information 
relevant to a matter 
Can obtain factual 
information and methodically 
record the varieties of 
information and their sources 
(paper document, oral, 
electronic) for future 
analysis; can plan work to 
research deadlines. 
Assessment by performance is essential in 
this skill.  It should be in as realistic a situation 
as is feasible for providers.  Assessment 
should also be embedded where possible 
within programme modules or projects, rather 
than in stand-alone assessments.  The 
following forms of assessment are 
recommended: 
1. Checklist of skills with allocation of marks 
or standards 
2. Simulated casework research tasks, 
assessed by tutor.  
3. Case file review by tutor 
4. Portfolio, in which students record 
progress 
5. Open-book examination 
6. Objective structured case examination 
7. Critical incident review 
8. Transactional assessment 
2. Analyse and 
prioritise factual 
issues 
Can identify gaps, 
ambiguities and 
contradictions in information; 
knows how to find further or 
better information; can 
prioritise legally important 
facts. 
 
Figure 4: Transactional research outcomes (extract) 
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Open Education Resources (OER) 
At the GGSL and in my work with the LSS it quickly became apparent that innovation would only 
disseminate if education providers worked collaboratively with each other, and treated their 
programmes as learning laboratories, and extended that to the entire jurisdictional curriculum.  We 
also needed an infrastructure that drew in a regulatory regime that promoted outcomes-focused 
regulation and encouraged collaboration and the sharing of educational resources and the costs of 
innovation, and rigorous research on educational practices and achievements. 
 
At a meeting at Ross Priory (a retreat house belonging to Strathclyde University), therefore, the 
GGSL proposed this approach to PEAT 1 providers and the LSS.  I followed that up with a paper and 
presentation at a UKCLE conference on Scots professional legal education in Edinburgh.  Along with 
that, some of our innovations in virtual simulations that formed the core of our transactional 
learning at the GGSL were made available via a HEA and JISC funded Open Education Resources 
(OER) project called SimShare.29  The simulations themselves ran up on open-source software called 
SIMPLE (SIMulated Professional Learning Environment), which was developed in a two-year project  
with a range of law schools and other disciplines throughout the UK, and funded by HEA and JISC.30  
Another innovation was the use of standardised or simulated clients – adapted from medical 
educational practice, it involved lay persons being trained to simulate a client narrative, and to 
assess the client-facing skills of a novice lawyer.31  This approach was adapted for the development 
of the SRA’s Qualifying Lawyers Transfer Scheme (QLTS), and has been developed in at least a dozen 
other centres globally.32  The documentation that we developed is licensed under a Creative 
Commons licence, freely available for non-commercial use. 
 
Shared space and regulation of legal education 
The experience of developing these initiatives and of working productively with the LSS fed into the 
LETR project on regulation.  There, the regulatory shared space of legal education, derived from a 
number of disciplines and from the consultation data too, is the idea that regulation is too important 
to be left only to regulators, and that it is the responsibility of all stakeholders to share in it: to share 
their educational practices, the evaluation data they generate as well as their research, and to 
engage in mutual learning, transparently and openly.  It gives responsibility to actors in the regulated 
field to regulate their own behaviour, subject of course to monitoring.  It is a dynamic concept, and 
challenges regulators as much as providers and others.  Regulatory activity, rather than directly 
changing behaviour, may well merely ratify already-established practices and opinions; and this 
effect can be mitigated by giving actors freedcom to act in the field.  In addition a shared space 
allows for innovation to be disseminated, critiqued, improved much faster, and for the design & 
implementation cycle to be made more effective.  LETR suggested that it is the responsibility of 
                                                          
29 JULIAN PRIDDLE ET AL., SIMSHARE: PROJECT FINAL REPORT (UKCLE) (2010), available at 
http://www.synergese.co.uk/PDF/115649_SimShareReport_final.pdf (last accessed 30 Jan 2017).  The project website, the 
design of which was a core element of the project, was completed and the report was deposited with JISC.   
30 Information on the SIMPLE project on the JISC site is available at: 
https://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/archive/20140614100650/http:/www.jisc.ac.uk/whatwedo/programmes/elearni
nginnovation/simple.aspx (last accessed 30 Jan 2017).  A video of students talking about the project is available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=myBSKs3-FTU (last accessed 30 Jan 2017). 
31 See the original correlative study: Karen Barton et al., Valuing what clients think: Standardized clients and the 
assessment of communicative competence, 13 CLINICAL LAW REVIEW 1–66 (2006).   
32 See, for instance, Wilson Chow & Michael Ng, Legal education without the law – lay clients as teachers and assessors in 
communication skills, 22 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 103–125 (2015). 
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regulators to design the space for this to happen, and in ss6.142-160 of the Report the authors 
mapped out how this might be designed.  
 
Such a shared space also needs an information space and infrastructure for all stakeholders.  Very 
few legal education regulators have archives of documentation that could be used to construct a 
history of modern and contemporary legal education in their jurisdiction.  Nor is this a matter for 
regulators alone: in our discipline of legal education, we researchers have a poor record when it 
comes to organisation of data.  Indeed our research informational infrastructure is in need of 
significant repair: without better information about what works and why in legal education and its 
regulation the process of regulatory reform is made more difficult.  By contrast medical education is 
highly organised in its forms of research publication and in the forms of research analysis, for 
example in the production of meta-reviews, systematic reviews of primary research, and the like.  
Published research is regularly summarised for policymakers and regulators, and this enhances 
synergistic information exchange among stakeholders. 
 
In one sense there is little new in this approach of the shared space.  Commentators on regulation 
since the 1980s have argued that the deterrent effect of legal sanctions in command-and-control 
models of regulation do not of themselves prevent harm or dysfunction.  Stone advocated that a 
regulatory framework should be employed to generate normative commitments within an 
institution or corporation via the organisation’s internal systemics, and the shared space approach 
builds on this to create networks of collaborative activity between actors.33  Yet it also a radical 
approach.  For the implication of the shared space is that it opens up regulatory control to 
democratic, shared responsibility for all.  It acknowledges that there is no grande récit nor is there 
any ‘grand solution’ to the problems of regulation in legal education.34  Instead there are, as Dekker 
and others point out, multiple narratives of regulation, change, standards, and much else that need 
to be heard, analysed and acted upon. 
 
There are narratives beyond regulation that illuminate out dilemmas. In Arrian’s Life of Alexander 
the story of Alexander’s encounter with the Gordian Knot is one of power and legitimacy, where 
according to prophecy, solving or untying the knot conferred upon the solver the lordship of all Asia.  
The knot bound ox-yoke, draw-pole and pin to an ox-cart, itself a holy object of earlier prophecy, 
and placed in a temple within the city of Gordium, in Phrygia.  Alexander, we are told, untied the 
complex knot by slashing the tough rope of cornel bark with his sword.  But in a lesser-known 
variant of the narrative Alexander did not use his sword: he removed the pin that secured the yoke 
to the cart-pole, enabling him to find the rope-ends hidden within the knot and thus to untie it.35   
 
The competing, complementary narratives are an instance of Dekker’s application of narrative 
theory to regulation.  He would probably argue that neither is a truth-narrative, and that both 
contribute to our understanding – of Phrygian culture, of the power of prophecy, of the conflicting 
perception of Alexander’s character, and much else.   For us in our time and place they are also 
examples of two modes of regulation, one an adversarial and command model, the other a more 
extensive analysis of complexity and a more adaptive solution based upon it.  The implication of 
power is analogous too, and is bound up with the occasion of regulation.  Standing in front of the ox-
cart, and with everyone present knowing of the prophecy and watching, Alexander could not afford 
to fail the occasion.  Nor can regulators now, authorised to regulate.  Nor can we, the regulated, for 
regulation is critical to legal education and our working lives.  Its effects and their consequences are 
                                                          
33 See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (Harper & Row) (1975).  See further  
Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW 239–285 (1983); CHRISTINE 
PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION AND DEMOCRACY (Cambridge University Press) (2010). 
34 Julia Black supra note 7.  
35 ARRIAN ET AL., THE CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER (B. Radice ed., A. D. Selincourt trans., Penguin Classics Revised & Enlarged Edition 
edition) (1971), 105-6. 
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substantial and far-reaching for teachers, institutions, students and the legal professions, and for 
society beyond the profession.  Every day we face the Gordian knot.  In response, do we acquiesce 
in, compromise with, manipulate, avoid or defy regulatory power that reaches almost all aspects of 
what we do?36   
 
Bernstein’s words quoted in the epigraph above point to how such power operates through 
symbolic control via ‘pedagogic modalities’.  As researchers have shown, it goes deep: it shapes 
forms of ‘consciousness, identity and desire’, through command and fiat as well as control of 
symbols and it claims to do so on behalf of legitimate social interests that are defined for the 
regulator by higher democratic agencies.  But if the power to accredit, monitor, shut down is all that 
regulation consists of, it will be a reductive and ineffective form of regulation for education.  I argue 
here for forms of regulation that will facilitate, enhance, encourage individual responsibility and 
community, and assist the understanding of complexity through open resources and methods.  
These are by no means the only approaches that regulators should take, but to date they have been 
under-used and under-researched in the regulation of legal education. 
 
                                                          
36 The modalities described here derive from Christine Oliver, Strategic responses to institutional processes, 16 THE ACADEMY 
OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW 145–79 (1991).  Black, supra note 7, observes that they need refined and I agree, but they are a 
useful starting point for any consideration of the behavioural options facing those under regulation, particularly control-
and-command regulation with little sense of community. 
